Traditionally, the ECJ has treated the international legal framework of the external trade law of the Community with judicial self restraint. Especially the GATT was perceived as a forum for interstate negotiations driven by the spirit of intergovernmental reciprocity. Thus, the ECJ has concluded that the GATT should be protected from intrusion by national authorities and cannot be invoked directly before the court. However, in the context of new developments, GATT and WTO-law are increasingly seen differently: International trade rules can serve as a quasi-constitutional constraint on excessive national trade policy. Basic principles such as the Most Favored Nation clause, the principle of non-discrimination and the prohibition of quantitative restrictions are reinterpreted as protection of economic rights of individuals rather than as protection of interstate reciprocity. Application of GATT-rules by national authorities is thus essential for the effective implementation of the "spirit" of GATT to fight a potential bias in favor of protectionism. This article comments on the historic conditions and the development of this fundamental change in the perception of the spitit of the GATT and tries to assess its consequences.
II. The classical perception: bilateral quid pro quo in international trade
The roots of the GATT-system are usually traced back to the executive trade agreements of the 1930s.(4) In that system, states offered reductions in national tariffs on important products on a bilateral quid pro quo basis.(5) Where one state reduced its tariff on a specific product, the other knew his trade balance would improve through higher exports. Thus, she could give in on another product and offer the same improvement to her partner. So both states could enjoy the benefits of increased international division of labor and corresponding productivity advantages without risking a significant trade balance deficit. (6) However, to ensure the trade balance effect of tariff reductions, more complex circumstances of import/export transactions had to be considered.(7) A tariff reduction could be offset by an increasing tax-load, quantitative restrictions or discriminatory administrative procedures. Therefore, the tariff agreements included not only the negotiated tariff specifications but also a basic set of rules on non tariff barriers. (8) Over the years, a standard-set of rules evolved that was included in most of the tariff agreements to secure their implementation. Especially three basic principles proved successful in maintaining the required trade balance equilibrium: The Most-Favored-Nation Clause, the Non-Discrimination Clause and a Prohibition of Quantitative Restrictions.
The MFN-Clause guarantees that an increase in export opportunities brought about through a tariff concession is not made void by an even more generous concession to a third state: Every concession to a third state would automatically be valid also for the partner of the agreement.(9) Thus the products of the protected state are always at least as competitive as those of any other state as far as the import regime is concerned. The Non-Discrimination-Clause assures that national legislation does not offset the tariff concession by the imposition of tax provisions. Finally, the prohibition of quantitative restriction ensures that the expected increase in exports is not hindered by quantitative restrictions.
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However, it was neither intended nor possible for these executive agreements to form a "super-constitution" that would substantially restrict national trade legislation.(10) Thus, the control of the equilibrium of the balance of trade effects did not entail a strictly legal law enforcements process. Instead, wide possibilities of short-notice suspension of the tariff-concessions provided the basic remedy for difficulties.(11) If a state realized that an agreement could not fulfill its expectations, an informal attempt of dispute resolution was made. It was not considered decisive if a state had simply miscalculated the trade balance effects of a tariff reduction or if the other state had offset the effects of the tariff reduction by increased taxes. The basic purpose was neither to clarify who was to blame for a disequilibrium nor whether there was a violation of the agreement or not, but to find any mutually satisfactory way to redefine the equilibrium. If no satisfactory solution was found, the agreement was canceled and the tariff-concessions where renounced. Characteristically, there was not even a distinction between "violation complaints" and "non-violation-complaints" in the dispute settlement rules. (12) The "spirit" of this tradition is in fact based on intergovernmental reciprocity. The basic rules of MFN and non discrimination formed but a forum for bilateral arm twisting in trade negotiations. Thus, to assume that a private person could rely against his own government, for instance, on the prohibition of non discriminatory taxes seems completely out of place.
However, the GATT-system is not simply a child of the executive agreements of the 30s. It is also a result of the planning for a "super-organization" for international trade and the negotiations on the foundation of the ITO.
III. A new Paradigm: The Stillborn ITO
In November 1945(13) the US State Department(14) presented a paper for "Expansions of World Trade and Employment," and in 1946 the USA proposed the creation of the "International Trade Organization" (ITO) in the newly founded UN.(15) In February 1946 the ECOSOC voted for a conference for the drafting of the ITO. Finally, in October the first conference took place in London and a "Suggested Charter for an ITO" was presented.
This Charter represented a change of paradigm:(16) Instead of bilateral, short time technical agreements on a low political level, a permanent, highly legalized international organization with a complete institutional structure should govern international trade relations.(17) Correspondingly, the idea of a law-enforcement procedure through three instances(18) with reference to the International Court of Justice in Den Haag(19) was developed. (20) From the very beginning this new paradigm was viewed not without skepticism. Access to the ICJ was soon restricted in the drafting process.(21) Non-violation complaints were maintained as a counterweight to the legalized enforcement procedure. Finally the whole organization of the ITO was stillborn. 
IV. The GATT -neither flesh nor fish?
So, what "spirit" did this "General Agreement" represent? On the one hand, it was a piece of the text of the ITO charter -a charter created under the new paradigm of a highly legalized super institution. (29) On the other hand it was a provisionally applied, shortened version in which every reference toward the organizational, structural and institutional elements of the ITO-Charter was carefully avoided. (30) Perhaps the decisive aspect of analyzing the "spirit" of GATT is exactly that it did not entail a clear message on its own general spirit -it was neither ITO, nor one of the 1930s executive agreements.(31) It lacked the formal authority of an international organization, but thereby it maintained the freedom to develop according to the need of practical experience. (32) While representing uncertainty in the drafting period rather than a decision for flexibility, in retrospective one can see that this openness for the needs of practice has allowed a constant process of legalization and growth of the institutional aspects of GATT. In 1955 the GATT developed from a single treaty for a one time tariff reduction to a forum for permanent negotiation, when Art. XXVIII on the "modification of schedules" and Art. XXVIII bis on "tariff negotiations" were included. (33) The next step of legalization came about through the unexpected success in tariff reduction: From 1949 to 1979(34) a nearly global participation in the GATT system was achieved. (35) Moreover, the amount of tariffs as an obstacle to international trade was reduced to near irrelevance.(36) As a consequence, the "hot topics" for the future were no longer questions of tariff-concessions(37) but questions of "supplementary rules:" The exact scope of the MFN-clause, non-discrimination issues, antidumping, countervailing duties and other non-tariff barriers became primary topics of negotiation.(38) However, these topics required a much more "legalistic" approach than the tariff concessions, since they were much more difficult to handle in terms of trade balance reciprocity.
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The third aspect of this sneaking change in the "spirit" of GATT was the development of a legalistic dispute settlement procedure and a strong institutional aspect of the administration of GATT. (39) 
V. The conceptual counterpart of legalization: constitutional political economy
Corresponding to this evolution of practical GATT-law and policy, a modern theoretical perception of the function and "general spirit" of GATT begins to evolve. The discussion about the "domestic policy function"(45) of GATT emphasizes its influence as a codification of "constitutional rules" and points to several characteristics that could change the general understanding of the relationship between private persons and GATT decisively. (46) According to the "Constitutional Political Economy" -movement and its application to the GATT, the primary function of the GATT is not the resolution of interstate disputes, but the regulation of intrastate conflicts of interests.(47) In the perception of this "domestic policy"(48) or "constitutional function" of GATT,(49) tariffs are essentially a form of redistribution not between governments(50) but between producers and consumers. (51) 5 Many national constitutions contain no substantive rules on international trade. Thus, protectionist interests of import competing industries and liberal interests of consumers have to compete on the same level in the ordinary political process.(52) This process, however, is structurally biased in favor of protectionism because of easier access to professional lobbying(53) and lower costs of gaining(54) and organizing information.(55) Thus, political economy predicts lower growth rates and welfare losses through unreasonable protection in the absence of constitutional restraints. Lawyers see the circumvention of constitutional rules on economic human rights and domestic distribution of income.(56) Under this paradigm, external trade law is one of the most dangerous and least controlled powers of government.(57) Therefore, there is a need for general policy rules to enhance growth and welfare as well a need for constitutional rules to secure the rule of law. (58) Since the political process is systematically biased, these rules can only come from a level higher than this process, i.e. from a constitutional level.(59) However, even national constitutional law is not sufficient: The only interest group that can compete evenly with protectionist producers is export-orientated industry. However, this group is not interested in national but in foreign import barriers. Therefore, it is necessary to find a common legal rule for national and foreign trade barriers. Only then will import competing industry (favoring protectionism) and export interested industry (favoring liberalism) meet on a level playing field.(60) Thus, international trade law is necessary to find a domestic equilibrium between liberalism-orientated and protectionism-orientated interest groups.(61) Free Trade Agreements thereby can work as a "second line of national constitutional entrenchment".(62)
VI. A different view on classical GATT -principles
This different perception of the "general spirit" of GATT also induces a different view on its general regulatory principles. (63) The prohibition of quantitative restrictions, for instance,(64) introduces a special test of proportionality in the area of international trade: Higher tariffs increase costs of imports; quantitative restrictions prohibit them. Thus, quantitative restrictions are the more oppressive intervention in the general freedom of contract. So, the (supposedly universal) constitutional principle of proportionality, specialized for the area of external trade by the prohibition of quantitative restriction in the GATT, requires the use of (today economically irrelevant) tariffs as the main policy tool. (65) Similarly, the MFN-Clause(66) is seen in a new light:(67) Instead of securing intergovernmental reciprocity, it allows individual traders to choose freely and internationally from which producer they want to buy.(68) Governmental price-intervention on the basis of the origin of products is rendered illegal as it intervenes with the right to contract. Thereby the MFN-Clause offers a specialized version of the "low level scrutiny" of the constitutionality of governmental interference with economic rights.
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The same is true for the principle of non-discrimination in Art. III: Governmental intervention on the basis of the distinction between "domestic or foreign" that influences the economics of the choice between potential partners for a contract is reduced to internationally regulated tariffs. Other forms of intervention, for instance through taxes or administrative procedures, are prohibited. If a product has reached the domestic market, the individual can rely on a non-discriminatory treatment and can therefore freely exercise his right to choose his partners for business on the basis of efficiency.
Table
In this "modern" view of the "general spirit" of GATT, the opportunity for individual traders to invoke a GATT-rule against their own government and thus to rely on its direct effect, seems to be the most natural thing to do.
VII. Conclusion: Consequences of the "modern" perception of the spirit of GATT
Since the coming into force of the WTO-treaty, the ECJ has successfully avoided to address the question whether WTO-law will be construed in the same strictly intergovernmental way as the GATT'47 or not. Perhaps the most important situation in which this question can arise will be a case involving the possible direct effect of WTO-law in the Community. At that time, the European judges will have to make clear whether or not they have been convinced by the modern perception of the spirit of GATT.
As ancient wizards looking at tea-leaves and oracles, European lawyers carefully try to read the signs.(69) To be sure, there are signs readily at hand for every opinion: The banana decision hit the crusaders for individual rights in international trade like a slap in the face and Affish (70) and Port (71) seem to extend this ratio decidendi. However, since that time the ECJ has spoken of a "complex question" in the Lehrfreund decision (72) and in Hermes/FHT Marketing(73) the advocate general seemed to try to pull the judges in the direction of direct effect. As everybody is waiting for a new leading decision, it seems to become obvious that a simple reference to the International Fruit Company line of decisions will not be sufficient to answer the current questions. In the meantime, there is nothing to be done but to wait and speculate. (6) From an economic perspective, however, the mercantilist use of trade balance to measure success of trade policy is highly problematic: the trade balance is the result of a complex macroeconomic mix, not just the trade policy. See Curzon, Gerard/Curzon Price, Victoria, The GATT Regime: Issues and Prospects 7, 16f in: Rode, Reinhard (eds.), GATT and conflict management: a transatlantic strategy for a stronger regime (1990).
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